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ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT-A TIME FOR CHANGE
ROBERT

W. FIORETrI* & JAMES J. CONVERY**
INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Act' provides a private cause of action for
an individual whose constitutional rights have been violated by
either a governmental body 2 or a private party. The remedies
* J.D., Lewis-Northern Illinois University 1978; B.A., University of Illinois, Urbana 1975; Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago,
General Counsel Division.
** J.D., DePaul University 1981; B.S.C., De Paul University 1978; Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago.
The authors wish to express their appreciation for the excellent assistance of James Balog, student, The John Marshall Law School.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The section that is currently the subject of increased litigation is § 1983, which
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, the
fifth section of which vests Congress with the 'power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. The fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868 and the enforcement
provision known as § 1983 began as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 333, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371-372, 2384; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1861; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)). Section 1983 was rarely invoked until 1961, when the
Supreme Court broadened its scope to encompass official conduct, which
was previously believed exempt. See infra note 2.
2. Until recently, it was settled law that a municipality could not be
sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, since it could not properly be considered a "person" within the meaning of the Act. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961). Monroe was expressly overruled in Monell v. New York Dep't of
Social Serv's, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), in which the Court stated:
Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body's officers ....

On the other hand ... Con-

gress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pur-
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for a party seeking redress include both injunctive and monetary relief.3 In 1976, the relief available to a civil rights litigant
was expanded to include an award of attorney's fees. The Attorney's Fees Awards Act, an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides in part: "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of [section 1983 and other statutes], the Court, in its
discretion,may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
'4
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."

This provision was enacted to remedy the situation created
by Alyeska PipelineService Co. v. Wilderness Society, 5 in which

the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not award fees
to a successful civil rights litigant absent express statutory au6
thorization or a special exception.
suant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
tort. In particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.
Id. at 690-92 (emphasis in original).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985-1986 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The district
courts are vested with original jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the
Civil Rights Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a) (3)-(4) (Supp. V 1981).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as
§ 1988 or Attorney's Fees Act]. Section 1988 also permits court-awarded attorney's fees in actions brought under §§ 1981-1982, 1985-1986. These provisions were originally enacted at a critical time in United States history
following the Civil War. Section 1981 was intended to confer equality in
civil rights. Section 1982 seeks to guarantee equality in property rights to
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. Conspiracy to interfere with another's civil rights is prohibited by § 1985. This section also provides a remedy against conspiracies undertaken to obstruct justice. Section
1986 provides a remedy against persons who, having knowledge of a conspiracy violative of § 1985, fail or refuse to prevent the object of the conspiracy although they have the power to do so.
5. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
Congress passed § 1988 "to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws
created by ...Alyeska and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws."
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 5908, 5909 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 10111. For a detailed
history of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, see SUBCOMM. ON CONsTrruTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D

SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976 SOURCE BOOK:
(1976) [hereinafter

LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY, TExTS AND OTHER ENACTMENTS
cited as SOURCE BOOK].

6. For a discussion of what may constitute a special exception, see infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
In Alyeska, the plaintiffs were a coalition of environmental interest

groups seeking to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from issuing permits
for the construction of the Alaska oil pipeline. The plaintiffs claimed the

issuance of the permits would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85,
41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)) and the National
Environmental Policy Act, ch. 55, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976)). The district court granted the
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp.
422 (D.D.C. 1970). Later, the preliminary injunction was dissolved, the per-
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In the United States, the general rule is that a successful
litigant is not permitted to recover attorney's fees from his opponent unless a statute or enforceable contract so provides.7 This
so-called "American Rule," however, is subject to limited exceptions. For example, a federal court will grant attorney's fees to a
successful party when his opponent has acted in bad faith.8 Anmanent injunction denied and the complaint dismissed in an unreported
decision. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973). On appeal, the district court was
reversed. Id.
Once the merits of the litigation were effectively terminated by new legislation, the appellate court turned to the plaintiffs' request for an award of
attorney's fees. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(en banc). The court granted the petition for attorney's fees based on the
"private attorney general" theory, discussed infra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. In this regard, the appellate court stated that the plaintiffs:
[a Icting as private attorneys general, not only have ensured the proper
functioning of our system of government, but they have advanced and
protected in a very concrete manner substantial public interests. An
award of fees would not have unjustly discouraged appellee Alyeska
from defending its case in court. And denying fees might well have deterred appellants from undertaking the heavy burden of this litigation.
Id. at 1036.
7. The American Rule differs from the approach of many other nations.
For example, in Great Britain fees are automatically awarded to the prevailing litigant in all lawsuits. See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees
and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974).
For additional support for the American Rule, see Fleischman Distilling
Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Stewart v. Sonnebon, 98
U.S. 189, 197 (1878); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1872). See also
McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element
of Damages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 639-42 (1931). But see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792
(1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fees: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?,49 IowA
L. REV. 75 (1963).

8. A federal court will award fees to the successful party when his opponent has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus-Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974). For example, in Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 186 F.2d 473
(4th Cir. 1951), attorney's fees were assessed against a defendant-labor organization which had entered into a contract depriving the plaintiffs, nonmember Negro firemen, of seniority and other employment rights. The bad
faith was evident where the plaintiffs were subjected to discrimination and
oppressive conduct by the powerful labor organization, which was required
as bargaining agent to protect the plaintiffs' interests. Further, in Bell v.
School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963), the court awarded fees to successful
plaintiffs where the defendant-school officials conducted a long and continued pattern of evasion and obstruction, thereby thwarting plaintiffs' wishes
for a desegregated education. Plaintiffs had sought transfers from a
predominantly black school to a predominantly white school. Defendants
imposed rules on black students that did not apply to white students. Id.
As these cases illustrate, the rationale for the shifting of the fees is punitive.
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
However, in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975), a case antedating
the Alyeska opinion and § 1988, the Court refused to award fees to the parents of Negro children who had successfully asserted a § 1981 action against
private schools. The schools were found to have followed a racially discrim-
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other established exception applies when, as a result of the suit,
a common fund is created which benefits an ascertainable class.
The costs are spread proportionately among the class members.9 Finally, court-awarded fees may be proper when assessed
inatory admissions policy. Id. at 172-73. The plaintiffs were granted both
compensatory and equitable relief, and, at the district court level, attorney's
fees were assessed against the defendant schools. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D.
Va. 1973). The court of appeals reversed this portion of the district court's
judgment. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975). Anticipating the outcome of Alyeska, the court refused to adopt the private attorney general theory. Id. at
1090-91. Further, the court could find no evidence of bad faith on the part of
the defendants. Id. at 1089-90. The Supreme Court affirmed. 427 U.S. 160
(1975).
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim of bad faith, the Runyon Court provided
some useful guidelines on this exception. The plaintiffs argued that the
schools exhibited bad faith, not by litigating the legal merits of the claim,
but by denying that they had in fact discriminated. At trial, the defendants'
testimony conflicted with the plaintiffs' and their credibility was open to
some question. Based on the ground that the defendants contested the
facts, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants acted in bad faith, attempting to
deceive the court and prolong the litigation. Although the Supreme Court
acknowledged the bad faith exception, it found:
[s]imply because the facts were found against the schools does not by
itself prove that threshold of irresponsible conduct for which a penalty
assessment would be justified. Whenever the facts in a case are disputed, a court perforce must decide that one party's version is inaccurate. Yet it would be untenable to conclude ipsofacto that that party
had acted in bad faith.
427 U.S. at 183-84. See also Newman v. Piggie Park Enter's, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968) (per curiam); Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). Cf. FED. R.
App. P. 38 (frivolous appeal); FED. R. Crv. P. 41(d) (vexatious suits).
9. The "common fund" exception applies when a suit benefits persons
other than the successful litigant. In Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527
(1882), the Court relied on its traditional equitable power to permit the
trustee of a fund or property, or one who preserves or recovers a fund for
the benefit of others, to recover attorney's fees either from the fund or property itself or directly from those other persons enjoying the benefit. This
finding resulted despite a statute which limited fees awards to specified circumstances. See Act of February 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (Supp. III 1979)). The Court construed this
statute to regulate only fees and costs as chargeable between the litigants,
not those between the attorney and client or "the power of a court of equity,
in cases of administration of funds under its control, to make such allowance to the parties out of the fund as justice and equity may require." 105
U.S. at 535. In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939), the Court
expanded this rationale to allow a fees award to a plaintiff suing on his own
behalf rather than as representative of a class.
In Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), unsecured
creditors of a railroad corporation brought suit to establish a lien on the
railroad's property which was under new ownership. After success on the
merits, the creditors sold their claims to the new owner. The plaintiffs' attorneys then filed suit against the owners for all legal expenses. The Court
held that the attorneys were entitled to reasonable compensation for establishing the lien on behalf of the creditors, and that such fees should be recovered with reference to the amount of all claims filed against the
railroad's property.

More recently, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
stockholders successfully asserted a claim against the defendant corpora-
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as a fine against a defendant who has willfully disobeyed a court
order.1 0
In Alyeska," the Court was faced with a fourth exception to
the American Rule known as the "private attorney general" doctrine. Under this concept, lower federal courts had granted attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in actions which advanced
2
the public interest or effectuated important public policies.'
The "private attorney general" cases were brought under the
Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act, which did not specifically
provide for awards of attorney's fees. 13 However, recovery was
permitted by analogy to modern civil rights statutes which expressly authorize such awards.' 4 Lower courts reasoned that
tion for violation of federal securities laws. The stockholders were awarded
attorney's fees at the corporation's expense. The Court reasoned that the
plaintiffs, by having brought suit, benefitted all stockholders. Further, the
absence of a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid did not
preclude a fees award. See also Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
420 U.S. 240, 257-58 n.30 (1975).
10. In such cases, the payment of fees is considered a penalty levied on
the defendant. In Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 42628 (1923), an unsuccessful party in a patent infringement suit, acting in contempt of court, brought an action to enjoin the enforcement of the prior decree. The costs of the successful party in defending the suit were assessed
against the defendant as a penalty.
When a federal court sits in a diversity case, the issue of a fees award is
altogether different. If the state law granting or denying fees is not in conflict with a federal statute or court rule, the state rule will be followed. 6 J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77 (2d ed. 1974). See also Alyeska
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
11. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska, the appellate court enunciated the
rationale for the "private attorney general" exception. The court stated that
in bringing the action, the plaintiffs had acted to vindicate statutory rights
of all citizens, thereby ensuring the proper functioning of government. The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs were entitled to fees because to deny
them in a case such as this, involving great expense against well-financed
defendants, would discourage private parties from enforcing environmental
legislation. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enter's, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1967), a case
predating Alyeska, the court stated that if plaintiffs were forced to bear
their own attorney's fees, "few aggrieved parties would be in a position to
advance the public interest." See also Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d
143 (8th Cir. 1974) (successful plaintiff, having vindicated strong congres-

sional policy in favor of private enforcement of civil rights, is entitled to fees
award); Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1974)
(plaintiff-teachers who successfully brought employment discrimination

suit were entitled to fees because they acted as private attorneys general in
advancing rights of other teachers); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir.
1952) (plaintiff, after successfully bringing racial discrimination case at a
very high cost, may recover attorney's fees). See generally Comment,
Awarding Attorney's Fees to the Private Attorney General, Judicial Green
Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 733

(1973).
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986 (1970).

14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976) (attorney's fees in fair housing

cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976) (attorney's fees to successful litigants
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granting fees was both equitable and consistent with the modern statutes. 15 In Alyeska, however, the Supreme Court refused
the
to acknowledge the "private attorney general" theory on 16
ground it was an invasion of the province of the legislature.
Congress responded immediately to Alyeska by amending
section 1988 to allow the award of attorney's fees to prevailing
parties in specified suits. 1 7 The aim was to provide the specific

authorization required by Alyeska and to make the Civil Rights
Act consistent with similar legislation. 18 In authorizing the
grant of attorney's fees, Congress did not specifically detail the
standards governing the propriety or amount of such awards.
These matters are left to the discretion of the district court, the
only guidance being that such awards be "reasonable" and
in suits involving discrimination in places of public accommodation); 42
U.S.C. § 2000b-1 (1976) (discrimination in public facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 1973
2(l)(e) (1976) (voting rights cases).
15. In Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court awarded attorney's fees to the successful party despite the fact that,
at that time, the statute at issue (42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (housing discrimination)), had no express fees provision. The court reasoned that since Congress provided for attorney's fees in Title H cases involving racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation, (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1976)), Congress also intended to extend this policy to housing discrimination cases brought under § 1982. The rule of statutory construction was that
"[i]n fashioning an effective remedy for the rights declared by Congress
one hundred years ago, courts should look not only to the policy of the enacting Congress but also to the policy embodied in closely related legislation." 444 F.2d at 146. See also Fowler v. Schwartzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th
Cir. 1974) (attorney's fees available in employment discrimination case
brought under §§ 1981-1982, absent express provision, by analogy to Title II
cases).
16. 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975). The Court admitted that it was desirable to
encourage the private enforcement of environmental legislation to implement the public policy expressed therein, but nonetheless held that the
longstanding American Rule took priority over this consideration.
17. See supra text accompanying note 4.
18. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 1.
Congress recognized the need for the private enforcement of civil rights
as well:
The effective enforcement of federal civil rights statutes depends
largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the
United States have civil responsibilities, their authority and resources
are limited. In many instances, where these laws are violated it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality.
Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases
to the courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney's fees
H.R. 15460 is designed to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to law.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 15581. See also SoUrcE BOOK, supra note 5.
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granted to the "prevailing party."'19 Despite the fact that a court
is not required to award fees, 20 in most cases a prevailing plaintiff will recover his costs of representation absent "special
'21
circumstances."
Since its inception, there has been a great difference of opinion among the federal courts as to the proper application of section 1988. This article will examine the judicial interpretations
of the Attorney's Fees Act with special emphasis on the meaning of the term "prevailing party" in various contexts. The question of whether the purpose of section 1988-to encourage the
private enforcement of individual liberties-is furthered when
substantial fees are awarded will also be discussed. The authors
will conclude with suggestions to limit the grant of excessive fee
awards, while still allowing those whose civil rights have truly
been violated to have meaningful access to the courts.
19. See supra text accompanying note 4. The lack of legislative guidance was intentional:
Congress has passed many statutes requiring that fees be awarded to a
prevailing party. Again the committee adopted a more moderate approach here by leaving the matter to the discretion of the Judge, guided
of course by the case law interpreting similar attorney's fees provisions ....
The committee intends that, at a minimum, existing judicial
standards, to which ample reference is made in this report, should
guide the courts in construing H.R. 15460.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 18, at 8.
For cases construing § 1988, see, e.g., Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21
(1st Cir. 1978) (successful party enforcing civil rights protected by statute
should ordinarily recover attorney's fees); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439
(6th Cir.) (district court in its discretion may award attorney's fees to prevailing employer in suit brought by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), reh'g denied, 561 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915
(1978); Wharton v. Kenfel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977) (statute awarding attorneys' fees in actions brought under civil rights statute applies retroactively to cases pending on appeal; prevailing tenant receives reasonable
attorney's fees); Beazer v. New York Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977)
(prevailing party in an employment discrimination action properly received
attorney's fees; Act applies to pending cases); Panitch v. Wisconsin, 451 F.
Supp. 132 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (prevailing plaintiff in civil rights action awarded
appropriate attorney's fees); Croker v. Boeing Co. Vertrol Div., 444 F. Supp.
890 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiffs establishing employment discrimination as to
themselves but failing to establish class action may be awarded attorney's
fees; defendint employer may only recover attorney's fees with respect to
its defense of the class action issues); Wilson v. Chancellor, 425 F. Supp.
1227 (D. Or. 1977) (discretion in awarding attorney's fees should be liberally
exercised in favor of prevailing plaintiff).
20. See supra text accompanying note 4.
21. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter's, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Accord Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978).
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THE PREVAILING PARTY REQUIREMENT

In General
The first question a court must address when presented
with a petition for attorney's fees is whether the petitioner has
prevailed within the meaning of the Attorney's Fees Act. The
statute's language 22 and legislative history 23 indicate that a prevailing party may be either the plaintiff or defendant; therefore,
both may be eligible for a fees award. However, the standards
that guide the court when considering the propriety of a fees
award for a prevailing plaintiff differ from those applied to a prevailing defendant.
A prevailing plaintiff is generally awarded fees under the
standard announced in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,24 a
Title II case involving racial discrimination in a place of public
accommodation. 25 In Newman, the Supreme Court held that a
victorious plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. ' 26 In adopting a liberal interpretation of the Title II fee
provision, 27 the Court noted that the congressional intent to encourage the private enforcement of civil rights would be frustrated if fees were awarded only when the defendant acted in
28
bad faith.
22. See supra text accompanying note 4.
23. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 7; H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 18,
at 2-3.
24. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976). In Newman, the plaintiffs brought a
class action to enjoin racial discrimination against the owner of five drive-in
restaurants and a sandwich shop in South Carolina. The district court
found that blacks had been discriminated against in all six of the restaurants, but granted the injunction only as to the sandwich shop on the
ground that Title II did not cover drive-in restaurants. 256 F. Supp. 941, 95153 (D.S.C. 1966). The appellate court reversed the denial of the injunction
and remanded the case with instructions that attorney's fees be assessed
against the defendants only to the extent their defenses were advanced "for
purposes of delay and not in good faith." 377 F.2d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 1967). It
was this subjective standard that was at issue before the Supreme Court.
26. 390 U.S. at 402.
27. The Title II fee provision at issue in Neuman reads: "[i]n any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for
costs the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976).
28. The Court reasoned that, under Title II, money damages are not
available. When a plaintiff obtains an injunction, he is acting as a "private
attorney general," and is protecting matters of the highest public interest.
The Court concluded that "if successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to
bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position
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Five years later, in Northcross v. Board of Education,29 the
Supreme Court applied the same standard in a suit brought to
enjoin school segregation under the Emergency School Aid Act
of 1972.30 This act provided for attorney's fees much like the provision in Title II. 31 The Court reasoned that the similarity be32
tween the two statutes justified a similar construction.
The Newman-Northcross standard was adopted by the drafters of the 1976 Attorney's Fees Act. The language of the Act is
almost identical to that used in the statutes at issue in both Newman and Northcross.33 This standard should further the overall
intent of Congress by giving prevailing litigants some assurance
that if they are successful on the merits their costs will be refunded. As the Newman Court recognized, the fear of bearing
the cost of attorney's services would prevent many aggrieved
parties from seeking judicial redress. Such a result could only
34
frustrate the public interest in protecting civil rights.
In contrast, it is more difficult for a prevailing defendant to
recover attorney's fees under section 1988. The rationale for this
distinction is that prevailing defendants do not "appear before
the court cloaked in a mantle of public interest." 35 Further, to
permit defendants to recover under the liberal Newman-Northcross standard would thwart the legislative intent that civil
to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." 390 U.S. at 402.
On the bad faith issue, the Court noted that if this was to be the standard Congress intended to authorize for the award of fees, no statutory provision would have been necessary. Courts have long awarded fees to a
successful plaintiff when the defendant has acted in bad faith, even in the
absence of a statute. Id. at 402 n.4. See supra note 8 and accompanying
text.
29. 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam).
30. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619 (1976) (repealed 1978).

31. The fees provision of the Emergency School Aid Act provided:
[U]pon entry of a final order by a court [for racial discrimination in

education], the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the proceedings were necessary to bring about compliance, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the cost.
20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976).

Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b)

(1976) (Title II fees

provision).
32. 412 U.S. at 428.
33. See supra notes 27, 31 and text accompanying note 4.
34. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter's, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).

35. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.
1975). This was a Title VII case filed by the EEOC against United States
Steel. The defendant's request for attorney's fees was denied on the ground

the suit had not been fied for harassment purposes. The court noted that,
while the public benefits when a plaintiff successfully attacks discrimination, "one cannot say as a general rule that substantial public policies are
furthered by a successful defense against a charge of discrimination." Id. at
364.
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rights be privately enforced in that impecunious plaintiffs would
hesitate to seek judicial redress unless their claims were highly
likely to succeed. 36 Recognizing these concerns, Congress indicated that a prevailing defendant may recover fees "only if the
action is vexatious or frivolous, or if the plaintiff has instituted it
solely to 'harass or embarrass the defendant.' "37 This standard
was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court in Christianburg
38

Garment Co. v. EEOC.

36. H.R. REP. No.1558, supra note 18, at 7.
37. Id. at 6-7. See also S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 5.
38. 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). Christianburgwas a Title VII case in which
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-employer had engaged in racially
discriminatory practices. The Court cited two reasons for awarding fees to
a prevailing plaintiff in Title VII actions which do not exist in the case of a
prevailing defendant. First, the plaintiff is the "chosen instrument" to advance policies of the highest Congressional priority. Second, the award of
counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff is an award against one who has violated federal law. Id. at 418-19. The Court also noted that when the plaintiff
has acted in bad faith, no statutory provision is needed to award counsel
fees to the prevailing defendant. This is so because of the bad faith exception to the American Rule. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. See
also Harris v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 662 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (in an
employment discrimination suit, prevailing defendant is entitled to recover
appellate attorney's fees if it is obvious suit was not justified in the first
place and never should have reached the appellate level); Gresham Park
Community Org. v. Howell, 642 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981) (in federal proceeding to enjoin enforcement of state court injunction, issues were not so clearcut that plaintiffs appeal could be considered frivolous; therefore, the prevailing defendant may not recover fees); EEOC v. First Alabama Bank of
Montgomery, N.A., 595 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1979) (EEOC as unsuccessful
plaintiff held liable for defendant's fees when there was no evidence to sustain claim of employment discrimination); Moss v. rIT Continental Baking
Co., 468 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Va. 1979) (defendant may recover fees when
plaintiff's deposition indicated the claim was groundless yet plaintiff continued to litigate the matter); Copeland v. Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C.
1977) (because plaintiffs employment discrimination action was initiated
solely to harass her employers, prevailing defendants were entitled to recover fees); Robinson v. KMOX-TV, CBS Television Station, 407 F. Supp.
1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (plaintiffs vexatious conduct, including failure to pursue discovery after defendant complied, resulted in fees award to successful defendant). A noteworthy case is Reed v. Sisters of Charity, 447 F. Supp.
309 (W.D. La. 1978), in which the court, in addition to assessing fees against
the plaintiff, also held the plaintiff's counsel liable for fees. The attorney
had made a highly inflammatory speech before the employment discrimination suit was filed. The court found that this speech encouraged the plaintiff's suit, which was frivolous and vexatious. Id.
In determining whether the defendant is entitled to fees, the court may
look to the relative positions of the parties. In Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5
(1980), the Court refused to award fees to the defendant-corrections officers
in a § 1983 suit brought by an inmate. The Court stressed that, notwithstanding the fact that the action was not vexatious or frivolous, the Christianburg standard applied with special force when the plaintiff is an
uncounseled prisoner. Similarly, in Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 389
F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975), the district court looked to the plaintiff's earnings
and savings to determine his liability for fees. See also Carrion v. Yeshiva
Univ., 397 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court looked to plaintiffs salary, fact
that she paid no attorney's fees of her own, and had no dependents).

19831

Attorney's Fees

While Christianburg is consistent with legislative history,
its application in damages actions challenges the integrity of the
judicial system. In addition to seeking an injunction, a plaintiff
may freely add claims for damages with the notion that if successful, damages and fees will be assessed against the defendant. However, even if the damages claims are found to be
without merit, the plaintiff can be confident that no fee liability
will occur unless his behavior violates the high standard of
Christianburg. In addition, the plaintiff has no incentive to limit
the issues, but instead is encouraged to develop novel theories
of liability of questionable merit. The result is wide-open discovery of claims that later must be dropped. Ironically, the defendant may still be wholly liable for attorney's fees should the
39
plaintiff prevail on other grounds.
There is no question that Congress intended the prevailing
party requirement to encompass the completely successful liti40
gant who receives a final judgment on his civil rights claim.
However, the propriety of a fees award raises troublesome questions when the litigation has been resolved by settlement or consent decree, or has been dismissed as moot. Equally
problematic are cases in which a plaintiff has been awarded only
nominal damages or has prevailed on some, but not all, of his
claims.
Settlement or Consent Decree
When the parties have entered into a settlement or consent
decree, both the Act's legislative history and the Supreme Court
favor an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff. In Gagne v.
Maher,4 1 the plaintiff brought an action challenging state social
welfare regulations. The parties entered into a consent decree
which provided for increased benefits to the plaintiff and other
welfare recipients. 42 The district court granted the plaintiff's petition for fees, 43 and the Second Circuit 44 and Supreme Court
39. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.

40. A prevailing party is one who succeeds on any significant issue in

the litigation. Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1978).

41. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
42. The plaintiff had instituted a § 1983 class action wherein she alleged
that the Connecticut Department of Social Services was calculating benefits
for certain recipients in a manner contrary to federal statutes and the Constitution. After discovery and negotiations, the parties entered into a consent decree with the district court's approval. The consent decree gave the
plaintiff, as well as the class she represented, virtually all the relief sought
in the complaint. Gagne v. Maher, 455 F. Supp. 1344, 1346 (D. Conn. 1978).
43. Id.
44. 594 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1979).
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affirmed. 45 The Supreme Court stated:
The fact that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather
than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing
in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court's powers to
award fees of full litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiffs rights have been violated. Moreover, the
Senate report expressly stated that "for purposes of the award of
counsel fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when
a consent judgment or without forthey vindicate rights through
46
mally obtaining relief."
The failure of parties to a settlement or consent decree to
provide for attorney's fees clearly invites the application of section 1988. 47 Therefore, it is advisable for the decree or settlement to expressly address the liability incurred for attorney's
48
fees; otherwise the court may award fees in its own discretion.
45. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).

46. Id. at 129 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 5).
47. Harrington v. De Vito, 656 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455

U.S. 993 (1982). Moreover, a fees award under § 1988 is still possible despite

a provision in the consent decree expressly prohibiting such recovery. To
hold otherwise would dilute the fees award and run contrary to the purpose
of § 1988. Jones v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 685 F.2d 236 (8th Cir.
1982).
48. While it has been argued that prejudgment fee negotiation could
raise an inherent conflict of interest between the attorney and client, the
Supreme Court has implicitly rejected this notion. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 453-54 n.15 (1982). In White,
the plaintiff brought a class action alleging that the state department of employment security failed to make timely determinations of eligibility for unemployment compensation, thus violating § 1983, the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1970), and the due process clause of the Constitution.
The plaintiff prevailed on the Social Security claim, but while the case was
pending on appeal, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which
was silent on the matter of fees. The defendant argued that this silence
constituted a waiver of a fees award, but the district court held otherwise
and awarded fees in the plaintiff's favor. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Sec., Civ. No. 76-71 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1977), as amended, Civ.
No. 76-1 (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 1977). On appeal, the First Circuit held that the
plaintiff's postjudgment motion for fees was a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
therefore untimely because it was not made within ten days after entry of
the consent decree. White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec.,
629 F.2d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court reversed on the ground
that the ten-day time limit, if applied to § 1988 petitions, would yield unjust
consequences. The Court reasoned that many final orders may issue during the course of a litigation, especially in civil rights actions where an injunction is sought. Often, it is difficult for counsel to discern whether an
order is a final judgment within the meaning of Rule 59(e). Therefore,
counsel would either lose the opportunity for a § 1988 fees award, or flood
the court with fee petitions at every stage of the litigation. 455 U.S. at 453.
The plaintiffs also claimed that the application of Rule 59(e) to § 1988
would necessitate prejudgment fee negotiations which could create a conflict of interest between the attorney and client. Because unsuccessful defendants tend to offer "lump-sum" settlements, it is up to the prevailing
plaintiff and his attorney to allocate this sum between recovery and fees.
Thus, the attorney may have a personal stake in the litigation adverse to
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Mootness

A "prevailing party" determination assumes greater complexity when the litigation is rendered moot by some action of
the defendant, without court order. The inquiry must focus on
whether the defendant altered his behavior in response to the

plaintiff having brought suit.49 As the Eighth Circuit stated,

"[w] hen defendants moot the suit by voluntary compliance the
question becomes whether the suit was the 'catalyst' that
brought about compliance by the defendants; if it was, the plaintiffs are prevailing parties for attorney's fees award purposes,
despite the fact that judicial relief may no longer be necessary. ' 50 The court will look to the relief obtained and the chrolitigation was the
nology of events to ascertain whether the
"catalyst" that brought about compliance. 5 '
that of his client. To avoid this potential conflict, the plaintiffs argued that
fee negotiations be deferred till after entry of the final judgment, a result
that the ten-day time limit of Rule 59(e) would not permit. The Court recognized this concern, but it was not considered a viable ground for the ultimate decision. 455 U.S. at 453-54 n.15.
49. Ross v. Horn, 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906
(1980). In Ross, the suit was rendered moot because certain state regulations were amended after the suit was filed. Judgment was entered for the
defendant. The appellate court remanded the case for further evidentiary
hearing on the prevailing party issue with the following instructions:
In assessing who is a prevailing party, we look to the substance of the
litigation's outcome. If the new procedures, which provided much of
the relief appellants had initially sought, were implemented as a result
of this lawsuit, the appellants were prevailing parties with respect to a
portion of their claims (which claims were thereby effectively mooted)
irrespective of the judgment entered against them on the balance of
their claims.
598 F.2d at 1322. In Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982), the plaintiff Ku Klux Klan members
were found not to be prevailing parties. The court determined that the suit
was rendered moot because of a change in the plaintiffs' behavior and the
suit was not a major factor in achieving this result.
50. Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs
brought a class action alleging sexual discrimination on the part of the
school board and the superintendent with respect to school-sponsored athletic opportunities for female students and faculty members. The defendant Board subsequently expanded the athletic program. The plaintiffs then
moved for dismissal without prejudice, subject to the allowance of attorney's fees. The district court denied the request for fees on the grounds
that the plaintiffs failed to prove they were the prevailing parties. The court
of appeals remanded the case, noting that the facts suggested that the filing
of the suit may very well have served as the catalyst for the Board's decision to expand the program. Id.
51. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982) (school systems abandoned use of allegedly discriminatory promotion standards for
reasons independent of suit); Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d
1288 (9th Cir. 1982) (when suit is moot as to all but one issue because of
action unrelated to suit, the prevailing plaintiff may still be entitled to fees
on the remaining issue); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus.,
663 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1981) (where employment discrimination suit is settled
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PlaintiffPrevails On Less Than All of the Issues
Another area of increasing fees litigation involves cases in
which the plaintiff prevails on less than all of the issues. The
general rule is that a plaintiff is not required to succeed on every
issue advanced in order to obtain reimbursement for fees. It is
sufficient if the "heart" of the relief sought is obtained, even
though other claims may be denied. For example, in Jones v.
Diamond,52 the court indicated that although a plaintiff's damages may amount to an insignificant sum, or even be denied altogether, the fact that injunctive relief has been granted is enough
53
to support an award of fees in the plaintiff's behalf.
Where, however, the plaintiff has prevailed on a preliminary
issue but has not received a final judgment, the rule has been
that the plaintiff is not a prevailing party.54 However, the legislative history of section 1988 indicates that fee awards may be
granted pendente lite for interim successes, such as interlocu56
tory awards 55 and success on appeal.
by arbitration after filing of Title VII action, the Title VII action was the
catalyst for the successful resolution of the dispute), cert. denied, 455 U.S.

1020 (1982); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney's
fees available when state legislature amends statutes at issue, thereby rendering the suit moot); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980) (where
only appeal, rather than entire action, is dismissed as moot, prevailing
plaintiffs may recover fees incurred in obtaining preliminary injunction),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981).
52. 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979).
53. Id. at 1026. However, in some courts the prevailing party may recover fees only for those issues on which he succeeded. In Busche v.
Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), the
plaintiff did not succeed on all the issues or against all the defendants, although he did prevail on the major issues. The district court, in reliance on
Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 911 (1980), held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover fees for all
expenses incurred, even though some of these expenses were related to unsuccessful issues. Busche v. Bosman, 474 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The
appellate court reversed and remanded on this issue, stating that
"[aIttorney's fees should be awarded under § 1988 only for preparation and
presentation of the claims on which a plaintiff is determined to have prevailed." Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d at 522 (citing Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d
577 (7th Cir. 1980)).
54. Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees upon obtaining a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. Yakowicz v. Pennsylvania,
683 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982); Hastings v. Maine-Endwell Cent. School Dist., 676
F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1982).
55. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Bradley was a class
action brought under § 1983 to desegregate the public schools of Richmond,
Virginia. At the time the suit was filed, there was no express fees provision,
but while the case was pending appeal, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. I1 1970) was
enacted which permits a fees award in school desegregation cases. The
Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that § 1617 applied to the
case, and also found that it permitted an award of fees for services rendered
prior to its effective date. 416 U.S. at 721. The Court was then faced with the
issue of when the plaintiffs had become the prevailing party within the
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The Award of Nominal Damages
The Attorney's Fees Act, on its face, indicates that a court
may either award or deny fees, and determine the appropriate
meaning of § 1617. The School Board had submitted three different desegregation plans to the district court over a period of nine months. The Court
held that the fees award could not be made until the final plan was approved by the district court, because it was not until then that the plaintiffs
were prevailing parties. Id. at 724. However, the Court also found that the
fees award need not be made simultaneously with the entry of a desegregation order. School desegregation cases may involve injunctive relief subject
to later modification, the court reasoned, and may involve many final orders. Therefore, a district court may award fees before the entire litigation
is concluded for costs incurred on the final disposition of interim matters.
Id. at 733.
Similarly, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), a stockholders' suit brought under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1981)), the Court
held that the stockholders should recover fees upon receiving partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, even though the determination of
the appropriate relief to which they may be entitled was still pending.
The Senate Report in support of § 1988 cited both Bradley and Mills
with approval, stating that "[such] awards are appropriate where a party
has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation, even when
he ultimately does not prevail on all issues." S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5,
at 5. Similarly, the House Report, also citing Bradley and Mills, states that
"prevailing" does not require the entry of a final judgment to support a fees
award. Interim awards may be especially important in cases of protracted
litigation. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 18, at 8 (remarks of Congressman
Drinan).
56. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). However, success on appeal
must involve a favorable determination on the merits. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). In Hanrahan,nine members of the Black Panther
Party alleged that their constitutional rights were violated during the execution of a search warrant for illegal weapons. The trial lasted for 18
months. At the close of plaintiffs' case, the district court directed verdicts
for some of the defendants. After a 4-2 deadlocked jury in favor of the other
defendants, the court directed verdicts on their behalf. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for a new trial and awarded the plaintiffs
attorney's fees for the appeal. Hanrahan v. Hampton 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir.
1979). The court of appeals held the plaintiffs prevailed on their appeal but
did not prevail in the district court, and therefore were not entitled to attorney's fees at that level. Id. at 643. However, the Supreme Court held the
plaintiffs were not "prevailing" parties at the appellate level in the sense
intended by the Attorney's Fees Act:
The Court of Appeals held only that [plaintiffs] were entitled to trial of
their cause. As a practical matter they are in a position no different
from that they would have occupied if they had simply defeated the
defendants' motion for directed verdict in the trial court. The jury may
or may not decide some or all of the issues in favor of the respondents.
If the jury should not do so on remand in these cases, it could not seriously be contended that the respondents had prevailed .... Nor may
they fairly be said to have "prevailed" by reason of the Court of Appeals' other interlocutory dispositions, which affected only the extent of
discovery. As is true of other procedural or evidentiary rulings, these
determinations may affect the disposition on the merits, but were themselves not matters on which a party could "prevail" for purposes of
shifting his counsel fees to the opposing party under § 1988.
446 U.S. at 758-59 (citations omitted).
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amount thereof, within a broad range of discretion.5 7 Although
the Act itself fails to provide judicial guidance, the history of
section 1988 supports a presumptive fee award when the prevailing party is a civil rights plaintiff.5 8 As previously discussed, the
Senate Report in favor of passage of the Act indicates that a
party who successfully asserts any of the rights protected by the
Civil Rights Act should ordinarily recover attorney's fees absent
"special circumstances."5 9 By incorporating the liberal Newman-Northcross60 standard, the Senate Report created potential
conflict: the "special circumstances" standard clashes directly
with the express language of the Act by leaving little, if any, dis-

cretion to the trial court.6 1 This conflict is most clearly illus-

trated in actions where the plaintiff is awarded only nominal
damages. On the one hand, the jury has decided that the plaintiff is entitled to virtually no compensation, yet under NewmanNorthcross, the attorney is permitted his full fee.
In Skoda v. Fontani,62 the district court denied attorney's
57. See supra text accompanying note 4. Of course, an attorney seeking

a fees award may be somewhat limited by the

MODEL CODE OF PROFES-

RESPONSIBLxrY (1979), which provides that an attorney may not
agree to or charge a "clearly excessive fee." The Code lists the following
factors as relevant in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
3. The fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.
7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id. at DR 2-106. See also Comment, Calculationof a Reasonable Award of
Attorneys' Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAR. L.
REV. 331 (1980).
58. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4. See also Davis v. Murphy, 587
F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the court stated that a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 action "should receive fees almost as a matter of course."
59. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 4.
60. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
61. Where the Act states that a court may award attorney's fees to a
prevailing party, the Newman-Northcross standard in effect amends the
statute to provide that a court should award attorney's fees to a prevailing
plaintiff in almost all cases. Although Congress chose not to use the Newman-Northcross language in § 1988, the majority of jurisdictions, in reliance
on the Senate Report, continue to interpret § 1988 in a manner contrary to
its express language.
62. 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981).
SIONAL
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fees to plaintiffs who were awarded a mere one dollar in damages by the jury. Using a common sense approach, the trial
court reasoned that the defendant was the real "prevailing
party" in that the plaintiffs had sought $200,000 in their complaint for false arrest and could have settled for $3,000.63 The
Seventh Circuit reversed, however, holding that the plaintiffs
were the prevailing party, and absent a finding of "special cir64
cumstances," were entitled to attorney's fees.
In an action such as Skoda, a question arises as to what
goals of the Attorney's Fees Act, if any, are being furthered. The
$200,000 sought in the plaintiffs' complaint was incentive enough
to attract competent counsel, without the necessity of a fees
award. As the jury's verdict indicates, the suit had little effect in
vindicating civil rights. The long-range effects of Skoda are even
more disturbing. By refusing to permit a realistic interpretation
of "prevailing party," the Seventh Circuit all but eliminated the
discretion accorded the trial court under section 1988. Consequently, the award of fees to a so-called "prevailing" plaintiff is
mandatory, although the only true victor may be the plaintiff's
attorney, who recovers a substantial fee for gaining his client
one dollar.
Aside from the "prevailing party" issue, the present application of section 1988 results in a lack of incentive for the plaintiff's
attorney to enter into pretrial settlements. The more hours the
attorney spends on the case, the higher his potential fee award.
The motivation then is not to settle, but to proceed to trial,
where the hourly rates are even higher. Further, the billable
hours may bear little relation to the merits or complexity of the
case. The injury to a civil rights plaintiff, as with common law
tort plaintiffs, can be determined relatively early in the litiga63. Skoda v. Fontani, No. 79-2932, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1980).
64. 646 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1981). On remand, the district court noted
that the major reason the case was not settled before trial was because the
plaintiffs' attorney felt he would not be adequately compensated if the case

were settled for only $1500. The district court reluctantly awarded fees of
$6,086.12 noting that the plaintiffs were "as a practical matter, unsuccessful
in achieving much of what they sought." 519 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (N.D. Ill.
1981). The court noted that any attempt to define the award of nominal
damages as a "special circumstance" so as to deny the award of fees was
likely to be fruitless. However, the court reduced the claimed fees and costs
by fifty percent, noting that it is within the reasonable range of a trial
court's discretion to bring the attorney's total compensation into a more
reasonable relation to the plaintiffs' monetary recovery. Id.
See also Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the plaintiff sought damages against various police officers for civil rights violations
and pendent state law claims. The court concluded that the award of attorney's fees may be appropriate, although the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages only on the pendent state law claim of assault ($1,320.00) and
just nominal damages on the constitutional violation ($1.00). Id. at 84.
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tion. Thus, the only variable factor is the time spent in preparing and presenting the case. Because the attorney in a tort
action is usually compensated on a contingent fee basis, his
time-investment strategy is governed by the amount of damages
he expects his client to recover. The civil rights attorney is
under no comparable restraint; in fact, he is encouraged to pursue all theories of recovery, secure in the knowledge that any
tactic reasonably related to his cause will be compensable. The
effect is that the defendant is held responsible for costs that
bear little relationship to the injury inflicted.
Nor is such a result in the plaintiff's best interests. The purpose of the Civil Rights Act as a whole is to protect those who
have suffered a constitutional tort. It naturally follows that if an
early settlement is possible, the plaintiff, the protected party
under the Act, should be compensated swiftly. However, a
plaintiff's attorney, who during the early phase of the litigation
has spent relatively few hours in preparation, may lack incentive to settle until compensable hours have reached a significant
level. Thus, the overriding goal of the Civil Rights Act is
thwarted and litigation is encouraged. The already crowded
courts are further congested, so that the taxpayer suffers as
well.
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES

The Attorney's Fees Awards Act seeks to encourage the private enforcement of the civil rights laws in order to fully vindicate the fundamental rights involved.65 This goal is largely
fulfilled when a party who has suffered a constitutional tort is
able to attract competent counsel to advance his claim. A question arises in damages actions as to whether the goal of section
1988 is being furthered when potential recovery is large enough
to attract able counsel without the added incentive of a fees
award. While most courts have continued to apply the NewmanNorthcross doctrine in such circumstances, other jurisdictions
have developed a different test. 66 This divergence of viewpoints
was inevitable in light of the broad discretion conferred by section 1988.
65. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 5, at 5.

66. In both Newman and Northcross, the relief sought was of an injunctive nature, where no money damages were available to attract competent
counsel. The objections raised in this article deal primarily with situations
where what is essentially a tort claim for private monetary damages is
clothed as a civil rights action so as to support the claim of attorney's fees.
The only purpose the Act serves in such cases is to provide a means for
paying the fees of a plaintiff's attorney for noncivil rights actions, a result
Congress could not have intended.
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In Zarcone v. Perry,67 the Second Circuit affirmed the denial
of attorney's fees to a plaintiff who was awarded $80,000 in compensatory damages and $61,000 in punitive damages. The court
reasoned that, due to the defendant's clearly wrongful conduct,
it was obvious from the outset of the litigation that the plaintiff's
prospects for a substantial monetary recovery were good
enough to attract competent counsel on a contingent fee basis. 68
Thus, counsel fees would not present a significant financial bar
to the plaintiff in instituting suit. In fact, the plaintiff had no apparent difficulty in securing able representation. The court concluded that when the prospects of recovery are bright, the
rationale underlying Newman-Northcross simply does not apply.
In other words, there is no financial deterrent to the enforce69
ment of civil rights.
Similarly, in Buxton v. Patel,70 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
denial of attorney's fees in a damages action. The defendant's
conduct, although reprehensible, had occurred in an isolated
setting and was not indicative of the type of civil rights violation
affecting the public in general. The plaintiffs' chances of success
were deemed sufficient to attract competent counsel who were
undeterred by the prospect of having to look to their clients for
compensation.7 1 Further, the damages recovered were well in
excess of the fees due counsel.7 2 The court also noted that there
was no evidence of bad faith on the defendant's part in opposing
67. 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). In Zar-

cone, the plaintiff, an operator of a mobile food-vending truck, had stopped
in front of the courthouse where the defendant was sitting as a traffic court
judge. The defendant dispatched a deputy to obtain coffee from the plaintiff. Dissatisfied with the coffee, the defendant had the plaintiff brought in
handcuffs through the crowded courthouse to his chambers, where he
tongue-lashed the plaintiff and threatened him with loss of livelihood. A

similar scene was repeated about one hour later. The plaintiff retained
counsel on a contingent fee basis.
68. Id. at 1044.
69. Id. In addition, the Second Circuit indicated that in damage actions
where the Attorney's Fees Act applies, a court's discretion should be guided
by factors related to the purpose of the Act, such as the size of the class
benefitted, the significance of the rights at stake, and the presence of bad

faith on the part of either party. Id. Accord Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367
(9th Cir. 1979).
70. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979). In this case, three plaintiffs filed an

action alleging violation of their rights to lease real property under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982. Plaintiffs sought actual damages for loss of profits, compensatory
damages of $10,000, punitive damages of $10,000, litigation costs and attorney's fees. A jury returned a verdict for each plaintiff of $7,500 in compensatory damages and $7,500 in punitive damages. After a hearing on the issue
of attorney's fees, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request of $11,574.
595 F.2d at 1183.
71. Id. at 1185.
72. Id.
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73
the suit.
The First and Seventh Circuits have rejected the "bright
prospects" standard of Zarcone and Buxton in damages actions.
In Sargeant v. Sharp,74 the First Circuit chose to adhere to the
Newman-Northcross test which requires the finding of "special
circumstances" to deny attorney's fees. The court held that a
contingent fee agreement is irrelevant in the determination of
what constitutes a reasonable fee. 75 In addition, the court found
that the existence of a private fee arrangement in and of itself
does not amount to a "special circumstance" that would render
a fees award unjust.
In Sanchez v. Schwartz,76 the Seventh Circuit held that the
"bright prospects" standard was not the intent of Congress in
enacting section 1988. The court identified what in its opinion
are the three aims of the Attorney Fees Act: opening the courts
to civil rights plaintiffs, penalizing obstructive defense tactics;
and generally deterring violations of fundamental rights.7 7 The
court intimated that although the "bright prospects" standard
may not prevent civil rights plaintiffs from seeking judicial redress, it failed to further the latter two goals of the Act.
The Sanchez decision is open to substantial criticism. Although the court recognized that a damages action may in fact
attract competent counsel, the holding exemplifies how far a
court must strain to protect an attorney's fees. The court was
apparently concerned with protecting civil rights plaintiffs from
fending off bad faith defenses or troublesome trial tactics, yet no

73. Id.
74. 579 F.2d 645 (1st Cir. 1978). In Sargeant, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees growing out of a suit for welfare benefits. The district court denied the petition because the plaintiffs attorney had already received a fee
on a contingency basis (the plaintiff recovered $88,816.58). Id. at 646. On
appeal, the court held that the trial court's summary disposition of the fees
petition was improper. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether a fee award was proper, and if so, in what amount.
Id. at 649.
75. Id.
76. 688 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1982). In Sanchez, the plaintiff brought suit
against thirteen Chicago police officers for damages incurred while the officers were executing simultaneous search warrants. The plaintiff suffered
a broken bone beneath his eye, a 5% loss of vision, medical expenses of
$2,000, and a month's lost wages. The plaintiff was awarded $47,000 in compensatory damages and $5,050 in punitive damages against two of the defendant officers. The district court awarded attorney's fees of $46,406.25
after plaintiff's attorney requested $59,815. Id. at 504-05. The only issue on
appeal was the fee award. The court of appeals affirmed the plaintiffs entitlement to attorney's fees but remanded the case with instructions to reduce the award.
77. Id. at 505. See also Note, Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U. Cmi. L. REV. 332,
344-49 (1980).
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such behavior was cited. 78 The second basis for the holdingthat a fee award "generally deters civil rights violations" 79-is
also of questionable merit. At the time the activity giving rise to
the litigation occurs, it is inconceivable that the defendant
would consider the possibility of liability for his victim's attorney's fees.
Further, should a court or jury find it necessary to deter similar future conduct on the defendant's part, punitive damages
are a more appropriate remedy than a fees award. Why should a
"deterrence award" be granted to the plaintiff's attorney in the
form of a fee, rather than to the plaintiff as an element of punitive damages? Any claim that liability for attorney's fees is an
additional deterrent is simply an excuse to protect the fees
award.
The end result of Sanchez is that fees may be awarded
under circumstances which do little to promote the aims of the
Act. A better approach in damages actions would be one similar
to that in Zarcone or Buxton. Where the prospects of recovery
are sufficiently bright, the incentive of a fees award is not necessary to attract counsel. In reality, counsel is attracted because
its fee would not be limited to a percentage of the ultimate recovery, as is the case in most tort actions. Thus, the only interest advanced by the Act becomes the financial benefit to the
attorney, rather than the constitutional rights of the client.
The purpose of section 1988 is to further the constitutional
rights shielded by the Civil Rights Act; it was not intended to be
used as a sword by civil rights attorneys to extract a fee from the
defendant.80 The problem was best expressed in Scott v. Bradley, 8 1 where the court stated:
A further consideration is that when a lawyer is setting his
hourly rate which he expects his own client to pay his client can
simply reject the proferred contract as too expensive for his needs.
The civil rights defendant can only "reject" the asked fee by paying
78. In fact, the plaintiff filed four amended complaints which resulted in
unnecessary "wheel spinning". Therefore, the court reduced the number of
office hours spent while the trial was in progress by fifty percent after the
plaintiff had already spent a full week preparing for trial. Sanchez v.
Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1982).
79. Id. at 505-07.
80. This is indicative of the double standard resulting from the present
interpretation of § 1988. Although the plaintiffs civil rights are protected,
the defendant has little or no protection except for the stringent "frivolous
or vexatious" standard the plaintiff must violate to be liable for the defendant's fees. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. The plaintiff can
exhaust a wide range of tactics to secure victory while his fee clock keeps
ticking. The defendant must limit his strategies, however, knowing that the
plaintiff will recover costs incurred in countering a defense.
81. 455 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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a lawyer to convince the Court that it is "too expensive.". . . Moreover, when a lawyer is working for his own client he sensibly limits
his research and preparation in proportion to the magnitude of the
results sought by his client and his client's perceived ability and
willingness to pay. No such constraints work on a civil rights plaintiff's counsel. Indeed, the temptation is just the opposite. Since
"the enemy" will be paying anyway, counsel is induced to read
every case, depose every witness, examine fully every tactic, leave
no stone unturned; or, stated in terms of the instant case, spend
123.7 hours preparing for a 4.8 hour trial.
Though civil rights attorneys should be encouraged to represent plaintiffs they should not be encouraged to overprepare the
case. Since there are no built-in economic restraints as in billing
restraint itself by esone's own client, the Court must exercise the
82
chewing a straight hours-cum-fee formula.

The end result in a case such as Sanchez is that we have two
victors, the plaintiff and his attorney. Although an attorney is
always the victor when his client prevails, a question of fairness
arises when the attorney's fee is equal to or far in excess of the
plaintiff's substantial verdict.8 3 After all, the plaintiff is being
redressed for an involuntary infringement of his civil rights,
whereas the plaintiff's attorney is engaged in voluntary gainful
employment.
Although the federal courts have put forth divergent viewpoints as to the propriety of attorney's fees awards in civil rights
damage actions, the majority view is that virtually all prevailing
civil rights plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees regardless of
the nature of the relief sought. The courts apply the NewmanNortheross standard to damage actions, despite the fact that 8in4
both Newman and Northcross the relief sought was injunctive.
In an injunction action there is no source from which to pay the
82. Id. at 675 (emphasis in original).
83. Such a result is often the case. For example, in Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1982), the plaintiff
received only $1,500 in damages. The court noted several factors that indicated a fee award would be inappropriate: the plaintiffs were not destitute,
they prosecuted on their own behalf, and the damages sought ($300,000) indicated competent counsel was not difficult to obtain. Further, a large fee
award would impose a hardship on the defendants. Despite these considerations, the court awarded attorney's fees in excess of $21,000. The court's
reluctance to do so was evident in its remark that "[t Ihis result is dictated
by the severe restrictions that the Fourth Circuit has placed on the court's
power to deny an award." Id. at 445.
A similar result obtained in Kow v. New York City Hous. Auth., 539 F.
Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The court rejected the defendant's contention
that the plaintiff be denied fees because the action was settled and provided
only a private benefit to the plaintiff. However, the fee request of $11,021
was reduced to $5,625 in light of the plaintiff's modest recovery ($1,540). Id.
84. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
the catalyst for § 1988, was also an action for an injunction.
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attorney's fees, so that a liberal standard is appropriate. 85 However, in false arrest or simple damages cases such as excessive
force actions, the verdict award may serve as a source for the
fee, thus obviating the need for the incentive fee award. The
major purpose of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act is to provide
an avenue of access to the federal courts to those of limited
financial means. The foregoing discussion indicates that an
award of attorney's fees in a damages action does little to promote this aim.
It should also be noted that the possibility of a fees award
encourages the filing of what are essentially tort actions clothed
as civil rights violations. 86 In a typical tort action, the plaintiff's
attorney's fee is normally limited to a percentage of the ultimate
verdict or settlement; whereas in a civil rights action the attorney's fee has little limitation, if any. Congress did not intend, in
enacting the civil rights laws, to create an additional forum in
which to litigate tort claims, thus burdening the federal courts
with litigation involving claims of dubious constitutional
87
import.
85. In addition, a plaintiff who has obtained an injunction prohibiting
behavior that violates fundamental rights "does so not for himself alone,
but also as a 'private attorney general' vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest importance." Newman v. Piggie Park Enter's, 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
86. This abuse of the Attorney's Fees Act has not gone unnoticed by the
courts. For example, in Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979),
the plaintiff petitioned for attorney's fees after successfully asserting a civil
rights claim against police officers for negligently failing to keep a police
dog under control. The court denied fees, stating:
[II
n the present case, the "private attorney general" concept has no application; plaintiff here is furthering no public interest beyond that furthered in most common law negligence cases. He has not by this action
attempted to curtail deliberate violations of constitutional rights by
Minneapolis police officers. He is not representing a distinct minority
group ... therefore, this is one of those rare cases where the court in
its discretion should not award attorney's fees.
Id. at 456.
87. The magnitude of current civil rights litigation was pointed out recently in a survey conducted by the National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers (NIMLO). With only 199 NIMLO members responding out of a total
membership of over 1,600, the 199 reported a total of $4,210,459,158 pending
in civil rights claims. This amount will no doubt increase upon completion
of the nationwide survey. The NIMLO survey further pointed out that the
aggregate amounts of civil rights claims against certain municipalities far
exceed their total operating budget. BATES, AMENDMENTS TO THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1871 AND THE CivIL RIGirrs ATrORNEY'S FEES AwARD ACT OF
1976: A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY MumciPAL ATTORNEYS DEFENDING § 1983
CASES

7-12 (1981).
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RECOMMENDATIONS

As the foregoing analysis indicates, the discretion and subjectivity vested in the federal courts under section 1988 has resulted in considerable conflict; in deciding a petition for
attorney's fees the court must balance the congressional intent
to encourage the enforcement of civil rights against the common
law American Rule requiring each party to bear its own expenses. Clear guidelines have not been developed or used in
balancing these interests, so that there also exists a conflict between the circuits.
If any change is to occur in this area, important national policy considerations must be addressed. The financial strains
placed on municipal defendants must be eased, for such pressures were not the results intended by Congress in enacting section 1988.
In injunction actions, clearly the need exists for payment of
fees from some source. A fee award is especially appropriate
when the defendant is a governmental unit and there will be no
damages. Yet it is equally clear that the overriding congressional purpose is not fully served by an award of fees in each
and every damage action. Some proposals have been advanced
to aid local governments in this area. Among them is returning
to the pre-award days,8 8 or placing a ceiling on awards based
upon what the highest paid government lawyer would be paid.8 9
A compromise between the diverse proposals is necessary
to serve the national interest. One possibility is that a prevailing party receive the traditional percentage of the verdict
awarded or amount settled as a fee. 90 This solution protects the
plaintiff in that his attorney's fee does not come out of the proceeds of an award or settlement that belongs to him. His attorney is adequately compensated in an amount equivalent to a
contingent fee agreement, an arrangement long accepted as just
compensation for a prevailing attorney. However, the defendant
does not escape entirely; he must still pay the ultimate award to
the plaintiff, plus attorney's fees. On the other hand, the defend88. Id. at 15-18.
89. The Reagan Administration, through its Office of Management and
Budget, has drafted legislation that would limit the hourly rates that law-

yers could receive when requesting a fee award. The top hourly rate would
be limited to the highest hourly rates paid to government attorneys in-

volved in the litigation that prompts the fee request. Chicago Daily Law

Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
90. In Sanchez v. Schwartz, 688 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1982), the court declined to find that a contingent fee agreement established the ceiling on a
§ 1988 award primarily because this argument was unsupported by legislative history.
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ant is protected from having to pay potentially exorbitant attorney's fees. This seems especially fair in cases in which only
nominal damages are awarded.
It has also been suggested that the "prevailing party" requirement be modified to that of a "clear and substantially prevailing" party.9 1 Such a standard would protect civil rights
defendants from fee awards in cases where only minor relief or
nominal damages are obtained. Secondly, it would discourage
plaintiffs from bringing frivolous civil rights actions. The public
benefit in terms of reduced court calendars is obvious.
Regarding the question of the reasonableness of fees, the
authors suggest that an award compensate only for the time
spent on those issues which were successful. Effective judicial
review of "billable" hours would limit civil rights attorneys from
putting forth numerous theories of recovery that are unnecessary and asserted only to build up a fee request. 92 Moreover, in
determining a reasonable fee, a court should be very hesitant in
awarding a multiplier or "bonus" to a fee award.93 Computation
of the fee award should be based on the hourly rate times the
number of hours spent on the issues on which the plaintiff prevailed. If multipliers were to be routinely applied to competent
work, the unseemly result would be that normal rates would be
charged for shoddy, incompetent work, while a bonus would be
available whenever a capable job was performed.
91. Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, Nov. 15, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
92. "[I]n computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be
paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client,
'for all time reasonably expended on a matter.'" S. REP. No. 1011, supra
note 5, at 6 (citations omitted).

93. In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the courts have not limited themselves to the "hours x billing rate" formula. This formula instead
is considered as only a threshold determination. The court may then consider the eight factors set out in the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmnirry DR 2-106 (1979). See supra note 57. See, e.g., Muscare v. Quinn, 614
F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1980); Waters v. Wisconsin Steelworks of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). In most cases, the use of a multiplier results in an upward adjustment. In Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d
240 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the appellate court vacated a district court's increase of
an award by a 1.5 multiplier. The appellate court indicated that an adjustment to a fee ordinarily will not be warranted, because subjective factors
will be reflected either in the amount of hours worked or in the attorney's
billing rate. The court further rejected the district court's reasoning that a
multiplier was appropriate for "unusually and consistently high quality representation", stating "[i]t is all too common for the district courts to adjust
the lodestar upward to reflect what the courts view as a high level of quality
of representation. This trend should stop." Id. at 254.
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CONCLUSION

The various proposals put forth are not intended to discourage or inhibit the rights of the truly aggrieved. Rather, the intent of this article is to return the focus of civil rights litigation to
the aggrieved party, away from the fee considerations which
have become the catalyst and incentive in bringing numerous
and often frivolous claims. One who violates another's civil
rights should properly be burdened with having to pay attorney's fees necessary to prove such a claim. However, the
amounts of fees being awarded and the nature of the underlying
claims must be viewed in light of the goals of the original
legislation.
Congress clearly did not intend the extreme financial burdens now being placed on units of local government. Nor did
Congress intend to water down the value of traditional civil
rights by awarding attorney's fees in litigation involving what
are, in essence, tort claims disguised in civil rights clothing.
Both the courts and Congress must take a second look at the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, and its implementation, in
order to more equitably protect those whose civil rights have
been violated.

